I was happily eating meat one day and I realized that killing sentient things might be the kind of thing society takes in stride but is actually really bad, like slavery used to be. I should do something like a crisis of faith regarding whether or not it's okay.
The question at the heart of the matter is: How do we morally evaluate animal affairs? Here are my intuitions:
1. If you light a cat on fire, that's really bad. If you press a button to instantly vaporize an unsuspecting cow, that's morally neutral. If you step on a snail, no biggie.
2. If you keep a chicken in such a small cage that it can't turn around, that's bad. If you neuter a dog, that's better but still a little bad. If you make sure an un-neutered dog never gets to interact with a bitch (ensuring he can't have sex and puppies), that's morally neutral.
3. If an animal is already dead, the act of eating it is morally neutral. In fact I think the moral neutrality holds even for eating dead humans (although of course that activity will have a different context and there could be all kinds of other negative terms that go into the morality summation).
4. If you pet your dog, that's good because he likes it. (You like it too, which is another positive term in the morality summation. But the dog's enjoyment gets its own terminal value.)
5. If you wirehead an animal, it has the same moral value as any other orgasmium (orgasmium is the simplest configuration of matter which can be sentient and have the subjective experience of happiness, and whatever triggers the happiness sensation is constantly on at full blast). And I think orgasmium's existence is morally neutral.
So when an animal exists, goodness is some function of its happiness that increases while the happiness is within the animal's natural range, and subsequently drops to zero.
The point at which the animal's existence is morally neutral is around "somewhat happy". As you move left from that point, it monotonically decreases without bound. And even while you're within the animal's commonly experienced levels of pain, your trough in the graph is already deeper than the peak is high.
Here is a somewhat counterintuitive application of my tentative animal morality. Imagine there is an Animal Planet which is home to large populations of all the different animals from contemporary Earth in various ecosystems, but with no humans. It would be morally good to instantly vaporize Animal Planet, because putting all the suffering animals out of their misery will surely outweigh the cost of killing the few animals whose happiness is at the top of their natural range (and not higher).
